Philosophy can be defined as the rational research of the principles and the truth of conduct, knowledge and being. Mathematics is a science therefore philosophy of mathematics can be referred as a division of the philosophy of science, next to the fields such as the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of physics. However, philosophy of mathematics covers a particular place in the philosophy of science. Natural science researches on entities are covered in time and space. In addition, philosophy of mathematics is pertained with the issues that are relatively related to central problems of epistemology and metaphysics.

The methods of research of Mathematics are different from the practices of research of the natural sciences. The latter gain general knowledge by applying inductive methods, mathematical information appears to be developed in different ways. Mathematical knowledge is acquired through deduction from the fundamental principles. Natural science theories are not certain, and they are open to revision compared to theories of Mathematics. Mathematics has problems of a relatively distinctive philosophy. Hence, philosophers have granted unique attention to epistemological and ontological questions regarding mathematics (Gerard 7).

On the other hand, it has been reviewed that it is possible to convey mathematical techniques to bear on philosophical issues regarding mathematics. The background in which this has been established as that of mathematical logic, when it is widely conceived as constituting set theory, model theory, computability theory as a subfield and a proof theory. The twentieth century has proved the mathematical research of the results of what are the vital philosophical theories regarding the science of mathematics.  When professional philosophers research on philosophical questions regarding mathematics they are assumed to add to the philosophy of mathematics.

Platonisticconcepts of rationalistic hypothesis of Mathematics trailed support by the twentieth century

It has become a problem to develop a philosophical theory of mathematics that relinquished off platonistic elements. Three non-platonistic accounts of mathematics were established: intuitionism, formalism and logicism.  Another emerged element of platonistic at the commencement of the twentieth century is identified as predicactivism. (Michael, 2).

The Logicism task

This task consists of trying to ease mathematics to logic. Logic is supposed to be neutral concerning subject ontological. This research seemed to complement with the anti-platonistic environment of the time. The suggestion that mathematics is the same as logic in disguise traces back to Leibniz. However, a solemn effort to study the logistic units in more detail could only be possible, when the fundamental principles of central Mathematical theories were developed, and the rules of logic were uncovered.

The set of the Gs is the same with the set of the Fs, if the Gs are exactly the Fs. In a well-known letter to Frege, Russell’s indicated that Frege’s fundamental law V alludes to a contradiction. Thus, argument is well referred to as the Russell’s paradox. Russell attempted to reduce arithmetic to logic in another way. Unfortunately, he found that the principles of his logic did not suffice to reduce even the fundamental laws of mathematics.

The theory of intuitionism

Intuitionism came from the work of the mathematician known as L.E.J. Brouwer. As per intuitionism, mathematics is an act of construction. The actual values are mental constructions, natural subjects are mental constructions. Mathematical understanding is mental constructions and evidence and theories are mental constructions. Therefore, arithmetical constructions are given by the ideal mathematician. He can never cover an infinite construction, even if he can arbitrarily cover wide finite primary part of it. A fundamental example is the consecutive construction in the period of a person natural member. From this general contemplation, about arithmetic, intuitionists infers to a revisionist attitude in reason and mathematics. They discover the non-constructive existence evidence that is not acceptable. Non- constructive existence evidence are proofs that purports to show the reality of mathematics entity having a distinctive characteristic without even implicitly having techniques for developing an example of such a unit. Intuitionists declined non-constructive data as metaphysical and theological.

David Hilbert accepted the intuitionists’ argument that there is logic in which natural numerical fundamental in mathematics. On the contrary, David Hilbert did not consider the natural numerical to be a mental construction. Instead, he projected that the numerical figures can be considered to be symbols. Symbols are conceptual entities, but may be physical entities, which could have the same role as the natural numbers. For example, take a physical ink copy of the shape 1 to be number 0, and a physical ink trace of the form 11 to be number 1. Furthermore, he thought that higher arithmetic could be interpreted the same way and perhaps even more concrete way.

Hilbert espouses an instrumentalist attitude with regard to higher mathematics. He believed that higher arithmetic is beyond a formal game. The arguments of higher orders arithmetic are interpreted as strings of symbols. Hilbert believed that there was no logical doubt about the reliability of classical Peano Arithmetic. Furthermore, he thought that every mathematical argument could be supported by making a detour in the course of higher arithmetic. It can also be directly proved in Peano Arithmetic (Roman and Schmerl 8).

Predictavism

This theory originated from the work of Russell. On the cue of Poincare, he came up with the following diagnosis of the Russell paradox. The Russell paradox state that the collection C of all arithmetical units that satisfies x is defined. The paradox then moves forward by questioning whether C itself satisfies this requirement, and arrives into a contradiction. The paradox states that the description of C does not have a collection in all way. It is not possible to explain a collection S by a form that relatively refers to S itself. This referred to as the vicious cycle principle. Explanations that do not correspond to the vicious cycle principle are referred to as impredicative. A clear explanation of a collection only refers to units which exist separately from the defined collection. Such explanations are called predicative. If arithmetic collections exist separately from the explaining act, then it is not directly clear why there could not exist collections that can strictly be defined impredicatively.

All these arguments led Russell to develop the ramified and classic theory of types. In this theory, syntactical prohibitions were developed in which impredicative explanations were ill informed. In this theory, the free variable in explaining formulas range over units to which the collection to be explained does not exist. In ramified type theory, the varieties of the bound variable in explaining the formula do not include the collection to be defined.

Before the Second World War, it was clear that substantial dissents had been elicited in antagonism to the three anti-Platonist subjects in the field of philosophy of mathematics. Predicactivism was not included, but it was a period of subjects without defenders. Thus, a room was opened for a renewed attention in the prospect of platonistic attitudes concerning the nature of mathematics. The platonistic view, the topic issues of mathematics comprises of abstract entities. As a result, there emerged four views about the nature of mathematics. These views include Golden’s Platonism, naturalism and indispensability, deflating Platonism and Benacerraf’s epistemological problem.

The Platonistm view

Golden was a Platonist with regard to mathematical objects and regards to mathematical aspects. This Platonist was more enhanced than that of mathematician in the boulevard. Quine’s developed a methodological review of traditional philosophy. He developed a different philosophical methodology, which has to be referred to as naturalism. According to naturalism concept, the best theories are the scientific theories. This means that people should not take into consideration traditional metaphysical theories and epistemological theories. Furthermore, people should not appeal on a basic metaphysical or epistemological inquiry starting from the initial principles. Instead, people are supposed to analyze the best scientific studies. They contain, albeit implicitly, the present paramount account of exists, how is known, and how it is known (Ruitenberg, Claudia 6).

Putnam put into consideration Quine’s naturalistic stand to mathematical ontology. Since Galileo, the substantial theories from the natural science are mathematically explained. For instance, Newton’s theory of gravitation relies upon on the classical theory of the actual numbers. Hence, an ontological commitment to arithmetical entities seems intrinsic to paramount scientific theories.

Bernays found out that when a mathematician is at his work, he treats the objects, which he is using in a platonistic manner. Every functioning mathematician is a Platonist. However, when a mathematician is wedged off task by a philosopher who quizzes mathematician concerning his ontological commitments, he is appropriate to shuffle his feet and departure to a vaguely non-platonistic situation.  Carnap developed a difference between questions that are external and internal to a frame work. Tait researched on details how something like his difference can be practical in mathematics. This has resulted in what is referred to as deflationary version of Platonism. According to Tait, the inquiries of mathematics entities can only be reasonably and sensibly answered from within a mathematical framework.

Benacerraf constructed an epistemological problem for diversity for platonistic location in the philosophy of science. The statements are purposely imposed against description of mathematical intuition such as that of Golden. Benacerraf’s argument originates from the premise that the substantial theory of information is the causal theory of information. Currently, few epistemologists believe that the causal theory of information is the paramount theory of information. However, Benacerraf’s problem is notably robust beneath difference of epistemological theory.  Benacerraf‘s work prompted philosophers to establish both nominalist theories and structuralist theories in the philosophy of mathematics.

Shapiro: difference between non-algebraic and algebraic theories

Non-algebraic theory is a theory that appears at primary view to be about a special model: the expected model of the theory. In contrast, algebraic theories do not have a prima facie state to about a special model. For example, topology, graph theory and group theory.

Conclusion

In the latest years, sub-fields of the philosophy of mathematics have started to arise. They enhance in the way that is not fully examined by the critiques concerning the nature of mathematics. These disciplines include computation and proof, philosophy of set theory and categoricity theory.

Dedekind draws that the fundamental axioms of mathematics have up to isomorphism, the actual model and that the same holds for the fundamental axioms of Rea Analysis. If the theory covers up to isomorphism, precisely one model, then it is referred to be categorical. 

arrow_upward